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What Happens at a
Bail Hearing Anyway?
The Supreme Court’s Troubling
Retreat from the Openness Principle
in Toronto Star v. Canada
Paul Schabas∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario,1 a unanimous
Supreme Court struck down a temporary sealing order on an Information
to obtain a search warrant. Speaking through Fish J. the Court began its
judgment with these blunt words: “In any constitutional climate, the
administration of justice thrives on exposure to light — and withers
under a cloud of secrecy.”2 The Court’s decision followed “more than
two decades of unwavering decisions” that have affirmed the openness
principle — from the seminal pre-Charter decision of Dickson J. in Nova
Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre,3 to the recognition that openness
is a component of freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v.
New Brunswick (Attorney General)5 and in Edmonton Journal, where
Cory J. emphasized the need for courts to operate in “the penetrating

∗

Partner, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto. The author was counsel for The Toronto Star on the cases referred to in this paper. Max Shapiro and Alyssa Manji, students at Blakes,
provided invaluable assistance in preparing this paper.
1
[2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Toronto Star v. Ontario”].
2
Id., at para. 1.
3
[1982] S.C.J. No. 1, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “MacIntyre”].
4
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
5
[1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CBC v. New Brunswick”].
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light of public scrutiny”,6 to Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.7
and R. v. Mentuck,8 which established a high test for any discretionary
limit on the public’s right to know what happens in courts.
In light of this long line of decisions, and 15 years of repeatedly confirming and strengthening the principles established in Dagenais, it
might have been expected that the Supreme Court would have difficulty
upholding statutory mandatory bans, such as that found in section 517 of
the Criminal Code.9 It provides that when an accused requests a publication ban at a bail hearing, it must be ordered and the public is automatically denied the right to know virtually everything about the hearing —
“… the evidence taken, the information given or the representations
made and the reasons, if any, given …”.10 Only whether the accused has
been released and, if so, on what terms, can be reported, regardless of
whether the ban is necessary to protect fair trial interests, or for any other
reason. Although a ban is discretionary if requested by the Crown, the
effect of section 517 has meant that, in practice, the public knows little, if
anything, about what happens at a bail hearing.
However, when the validity of section 517 came before the Court
recently, eight of the nine judges had little difficulty upholding the
provision.11 In what must be seen as a retreat from its holdings on the
importance of openness, the Court gave little weight to its previously
stated requirements that the public’s right to know should only be limited
where it is “necessary”, based on concerns that are “well grounded” in
evidence, and that such limits cannot be justified on the basis of “remote” or “speculative” concerns.12
This paper reviews the history of the openness principle, including
the “more than two decades of unwavering decisions” of the Supreme
Court favouring openness.13 It then discusses the recent decision uphold-

6
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R.
1326, at para. 9 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”].
7
[1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”].
8
[2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mentuck”].
9
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
10
Id., s. 517.
11
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] S.C.J. No. 21, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC”].
12
Dagenais, supra, note 7, at 880; Mentuck, supra, note 8, at paras. 32, 34.
13
Toronto Star v. Ontario, supra, note 1, at para. 30.
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ing section 517 in Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC,14 and the difficulty in
reconciling it with the Court’s other decisions in this area. Although the
case may, arguably, be limited to the context of statutory, mandatory
bans, the Court’s approach is a troubling departure from its previous
decisions that looked skeptically at assertions of trial unfairness and
other claims of prejudice to parties arising from openness.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE
The openness principle is at least as old as the common law. It was a
critical element of the development of the English justice system, as
judges travelled to towns in England to conduct public trials before the
community. In the 17th century, Charles I’s use of the Star Chamber,
which operated in private, was a source of complaint in the years leading
to the English Civil War. Openness, however, was not seen merely as a
way of scrutinizing the judges, but was also regarded as a key component
of finding the truth: “Blackstone stressed that the open examination of
witnesses ‘in the presence of all mankind’ was more conducive to
ascertaining the truth than secret examinations.”15 Wigmore too recognized the role of openness in improving “the quality of testimony”.16
Equally important, is that an open trial ensures that the parties, including
the judge and jury, conduct themselves properly. It serves a valuable
educational function by informing the public of what goes on in courts
and fostering public confidence in them. Bentham put it eloquently in his
well-known “darkness of secrecy” passage: “Publicity is the very soul of
justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards
against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.”17
The openness principle has been repeatedly confirmed in the case
law. Lord Shaw, in Scott v. Scott,18 referred to Bentham’s famous passage
in holding that family court matters must be public. Lord Halsbury stated
14

Supra, note 11.
See Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6, at para. 55, per Wilson J., citing Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 3 (1768), c. 23, at 373. For a detailed review of the
history of openness, dating even back to Roman times, see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
16
Edmonton Journal, id., at para. 55.
17
Cited by Dickson J. in MacIntyre, supra, note 3, at 183.
18
[1913] A.C. 417, at 477 (H.L.).
15
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bluntly that “every court of justice is open to every subject of the
King”.19 And Lord Blanesburgh stated subsequently, in McPherson v.
McPherson, that “publicity is the authentic hall-mark of judicial as
distinct from administrative procedure ...”.20
In his seminal pre-Charter decision on openness, Dickson J. in MacIntyre held that Informations to obtain search warrants must be subject to
public scrutiny once the warrant has been executed, observing that
“covertness is the exception and openness the rule. Public confidence in
the integrity of the court system and understanding of the administration
of justice are thereby fostered”.21
Justice Dickson went on to state that “[a]s a general rule the sensibilities of the individuals involved are no basis for exclusion of the
public from judicial proceedings,” noting that “[a]t every stage the rule
should be one of public accessibility and concomitant judicial accountability.”22
Post-Charter, the openness principle has been recognized as a component of freedom of expression protected by section 2(b) of the Charter.
In Edmonton Journal,23 the Court declared invalid legislation that
restricted the ability of the press to report on details of matrimonial
proceedings. Following MacIntyre, Cory J. (who wrote the principal
judgment concurred in by Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J.), emphasized that
[t]he more complex society becomes, the more important becomes the
function of the courts. As a result of their significance, the courts must
be open to public scrutiny and to public criticism of their operation by
the public ... The press must be free to comment upon court
proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate
openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.24

Edmonton Journal25 elaborated on the holding of the Supreme Court
in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),26 that freedom of expression
19

Id., at 440.
[1936] A.C. 177, at 200-202 (P.C.).
21
MacIntyre, supra, note 3, at 185.
22
MacIntyre, id., at 185-86. It is interesting to note that Dickson J. referred with approval to
a much earlier decision of the Court of Duff J. (as he then was) in Gazette Printing Co. v. Shallow,
[1909] S.C.J. No. 7, 41 S.C.R. 339, at 359 (S.C.C.), in which the Court upheld the openness
principle over a century ago.
23
Supra, note 6.
24
Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6, at paras. 5, 9.
25
Id., at para. 10.
20
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“protects listeners as well as speakers”, noting that “[t]hose who cannot
attend rely in large measure upon the press to inform them about court
proceedings — the nature of the evidence that was called, the arguments
presented, the comments made by the trial judge — in order to know not
only what rights they may have, but how their problems might be dealt
with in court.” As Cory J. continued:
It is only through the press that most individuals can really learn of
what is transpiring in the courts. They as “listeners” or readers have a
right to receive this information. Only then can they make an
assessment of the institution. Discussion of court cases and constructive
criticism of court proceedings is dependent upon the receipt by the
public of information as to what transpired in court. Practically
speaking, this information can only be obtained from the newspapers or
other media.27

Following Edmonton Journal, in CBC v. New Brunswick, a unanimous Court recognized the constitutional aspect of openness. There, La
Forest J. stated:
That the right of the public to information relating to court proceedings,
and the corollary right to put forward opinions pertaining to the courts,
depend on the freedom of the press to transmit this information is
fundamental to an understanding of the importance of that freedom.
The full and fair discussion of public institutions, which is vital to any
democracy, is the raison d’être of the s. 2(b) guarantees. Debate in the
public domain is predicated on an informed public, which is in turn
reliant upon a free and vigorous press. The public’s entitlement to be
informed imposes on the media the responsibility to inform fairly and
accurately. This responsibility is especially grave given that the
freedom of the press is, and must be, largely unfettered.28

In CBC v. New Brunswick, the public broadcaster challenged section
486 of the Criminal Code, which makes openness subject to a number of
exceptions, including the need to exclude the public where necessary for
the “proper administration of justice”. Here, the Court found that a trial
judge had not been justified in excluding the public from a sentencing
hearing in a sexual assault matter, but nevertheless upheld section 486
26
27
28

[1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at 767 (S.C.C.).
Edmonton Journal, supra, note 6, at para. 10.
CBC v. New Brunswick, supra, note 5, at para. 23 (emphasis added).
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because it contained a valid objective and could be narrowly applied
through proper exercise of judicial discretion. The Court relied on the
principles enunciated in Dagenais,29 directing trial judges to consider
alternatives to closing the courts in order to ensure that any restriction on
public access is “limited as much as possible”, by balancing the competing interests.30

III. DISCRETIONARY BANS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DAGENAIS/MENTUCK TEST
Dagenais is perhaps the most important Charter case on the openness
principle. It arose from a ban imposed by courts in Ontario on the
broadcast of a docudrama, The Boys of St. Vincent, dealing with abuse of
boys by priests based loosely on the events disclosed in the Mount
Cashel Inquiry,31 because trials of priests on sexual abuse charges dealing
with similar facts were ongoing or imminent in Ontario. The Supreme
Court overturned the bans, and in doing so discarded what it described as
“[t]he pre-Charter common law rule governing publication bans [which]
emphasized the right to a fair trial over the free expression interests of
those affected by the ban.” Chief Justice Lamer held, for the majority, as
follows:
In my view, the balance this rule strikes is inconsistent with the
principles of the Charter, and in particular, the equal status given by
the Charter to ss. 2(b) and 11(d). It would be inappropriate for the
courts to continue to apply a common law rule that automatically
favoured the rights protected by s. 11(d) over those protected by s. 2(b).
A hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must
be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing
the common law. When the protected rights of two individuals come
into conflict, as can occur in the case of publication bans, Charter
principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the
importance of both sets of rights.32

29
30
31

Dagenais, supra, note 7.
See CBC v. New Brunswick, supra, note 5, at para. 61.
See, e.g., R. v. Kenny, [1991] N.J. No. 253, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 36 (Nfld. T.D.) [hereinafter

“Kenny”].
32

Dagenais, supra, note 7, at para. 72 (emphasis added).
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Chief Justice Lamer went on to formulate the rule for when publication bans should be ordered, as follows:
A publication ban should only be ordered when:
(a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial
risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available
alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
(b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious
effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban.33

In Dagenais, Lamer C.J.C. emphasized that bans should only be ordered to “prevent real and substantial risks of trial unfairness — publication bans are not available as protection against remote and speculative
dangers”.34 He emphasized the strength of the jury system, and noted that
alternative measures to bans “readily came to mind”, including “adjourning trials, changing venues, sequestering jurors, allowing challenges for
cause and voir dires during jury selection, and providing strong judicial
direction to the jury”.35
Dagenais dealt with the balancing of the openness principle against
risk to fair trial interests. However, the Court has taken Dagenais further.
In Mentuck,36 the Court modified the Dagenais test to apply to other
discretionary bans, such as protecting the proper administration of
justice. There, the Crown had sought a ban on specific undercover police
techniques — including the now well-known “crime boss” scenario. In
rejecting the ban, Iacobucci J. modified the Dagenais test as follows:
A publication ban should only be ordered when:
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the
proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative
measures will not prevent the risk; and
(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious
effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public,
including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the

33
34
35
36

Id., at para. 73 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 76 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 79.
Mentuck, supra, note 8.
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accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the
administration of justice.37

In addition, the Court gave further guidance and strength to what has
now become known as the “Dagenais/Mentuck test”, emphasizing that
for the “real and substantial” risk test to be met: “it must be a risk the
reality of which is well-grounded in the evidence”. Justice Iacobucci
continued: “It must also be a risk that poses a serious threat to the proper
administration of justice. In other words, it is a serious danger sought to
be avoided that is required, not a substantial benefit or advantage to the
administration of justice sought to be obtained.”38
Indeed, Iacobucci J. made even clearer the importance of openness
and the heavy burden on a party seeking to justify a ban in the following
passage:
It is precisely because the presumption that courts should be open and
reporting of their proceedings should be uncensored is so strong and so
highly valued in our society that the judge must have a convincing
evidentiary basis for issuing a ban. Effective investigation and evidence
gathering, while important in its own right, should not be regarded as
weakening the strong presumptive public interest, which may go
unargued by counsel more frequently as the number of applications for
publication bans increases, in a transparent court system and in
generally unrestricted speech on matters of such public importance as
the administration of justice.39

The Dagenais/Mentuck principles are not just reserved to criminal
law. In Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance),40 the
Supreme Court modified the Dagenais/Mentuck test to also apply to
place the same heavy burden on parties seeking to limit public access to,
and reporting of, civil litigation where commercial interests might
otherwise prefer confidentiality. In Sierra Club, the Court articulated the
test as follows:

37

Id., at para. 32.
Id., at para. 34 (emphasis added). Subsequently, in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v.
Ontario, [2003] O.J. No. 4006, 67 O.R. (3d) 577, at para. 27 (Ont. C.A.), Doherty J.A. put this
principle more bluntly: “Fundamental freedoms, like the freedom of expression and freedom of the
press, cannot, however, be sacrificed to give the police a ‘leg up’ on an investigation.”
39
Mentuck, supra, note 8, at para. 39.
40
[2002] S.C.J. No. 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).
38

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE SUPREME COURT’S RETREAT FROM OPENNESS

205

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 [of the Federal Court Rules,
1998] should only be granted when:
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an
important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context
of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not
prevent the risk; and
(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the
effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its
deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free
expression, which in this context includes the public interest in
open and accessible court proceedings.41

The Court emphasized that a “commercial interest” sufficient to meet
the test must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest
in protecting the commercial interest. Thus, the commercial interest that
is sought to be protected must transcend the parties.42
The Dagenais/Mentuck test has been repeatedly applied over the past
15 years. It is regarded as a “flexible and contextual test” that applies to
all exercises of judicial discretion that have the effect of limiting freedom
of expression and the public’s right to know what happens in courts.43 In
2005, in Toronto Star v. Ontario, the Supreme Court strongly confirmed
the Dagenais/Mentuck test in striking down a temporary sealing order on
search warrant materials. As Fish J. stated in response to the Crown’s
argument that the test should not apply: “This argument is doomed to
failure by more than two decades of unwavering decisions in this Court:
the Dagenais/Mentuck test has repeatedly and consistently been applied
to all discretionary judicial orders limiting the openness of judicial
proceedings.”44

41

Id., at para. 53.
Id., at para. 55, where Iacobucci J. endorsed the words of Binnie J. in Re N. (F.), [2000]
S.C.J. No. 34, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, at para. 10 (S.C.C.): “the open court rule only yields ‘where the
public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness’” (emphasis added).
43
Supra, note 1, at para. 31.
44
Id., at para. 30.
42
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IV. STATUTORY BANS
The Dagenais/Mentuck/Sierra Club test applies to discretionary
bans. However, it is a direct application of the openness principle
protected by section 2(b) of the Charter. Further, the Court recognized in
Mentuck that the Dagenais test “incorporates the essence of section 1 of
the Charter and the Oakes test”.45 Indeed, in CBC v. New Brunswick, in
upholding the validity of section 486(1) of the Criminal Code (which
permits limits on public access in the interests of “the proper administration of justice”), the Court found section 1 applied by considering the
same factors found in Dagenais and Mentuck. Because the section
granted the judge discretion, which must be exercised by considering
whether the limitation was necessary, having regard to the availability of
“reasonable and effective alternatives”, “whether the order is limited as
much as possible”, and to “weigh the importance of the ... particular
order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the
particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the
positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate”, the provision was found to be valid.46
In light of these “unwavering decisions”, the validity of mandatory
bans to protect fair trial interests has been in doubt at least since Dagenais.47 Two such bans are regularly ordered in criminal proceedings: bans
on bail hearings and bans on preliminary inquiries, provided in sections
517 and 539, respectively, of the Criminal Code. The provisions are
similar in their terms, directing that a ban shall be ordered if requested by
the accused, but only may be ordered if requested by the Crown. While
the ban at a preliminary inquiry only applies to “the evidence taken at the
inquiry”, the ban at a bail hearing is broader, applying to “the evidence
taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons,
if any, given or to be given by the justice”. Both bans, once imposed,
continue until the accused is either discharged or the trial is concluded.
Both sections make it a criminal offence to breach the ban.48
45

Mentuck, supra, note 8, at para. 27.
Id., at para. 25; CBC v. New Brunswick, supra, note 5, at para. 69.
47
Supra, note 7.
48
The terms of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 517(1) are as follows:
(1) If the prosecutor or the accused intends to show cause under section 515, he or
she shall so state to the justice and the justice may, and shall on application by the
46
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These provisions effectively give an accused the right to override the
public’s right to know, regardless of what evidence or submissions may
be made at the bail hearing or preliminary inquiry, and regardless of
whether a jury trial is likely, or even possible. In practice, the sections are
routinely invoked and, as a result, the public knows little of, and rarely
hears about, what occurs at a bail hearing or preliminary inquiry.

V. HISTORY OF THE STATUTORY BANS
Statutory publication bans on bail hearings were first introduced as
part of the Bail Reform Act of 1972, which strengthened protections for
those charged with criminal offences, such as shifting the burden to the
State to justify detention, on limited and specific grounds.49 What is now
section 517 originally only permitted discretionary bans, however, and
seems to have passed without discussion or attention in Parliament. In
1976, the provision was amended to make bans mandatory when requested by the accused. Again, there was no substantive discussion of
this section in Parliament.50
There was no historical justification for the mandatory ban when it
was introduced. Professor Friedland, whose book Detention Before Trial
led to the Bail Reform Act, did not address the issue.51 Until 1972, all bail

accused, before or at any time during the course of the proceedings under that section,
make an order directing that the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, if any, given or to be given by the justice shall not be published in any document, or broadcast or transmitted in any way before such time as
(a) if a preliminary inquiry is held, the accused in respect of whom the proceedings
are held is discharged; or
(b) if the accused in respect of whom the proceedings are held is tried or ordered to
stand trial, the trial is ended.
49
Prior to 1972, bail was determined under An Act Respecting the Duties of the Justice of
the Peace, Out of Sessions in Relation to Respondents Charged with Indictable Offences, S.C. 1869,
c. 30; R. v. Rae, [1914] O.J. No. 113, 23 C.C.C. 266 (Ont. H.C.).
50
An explanatory footnote to the original bill states only that the amendment is “in part” consequential to other amendments, these include shifting the onus to the accused to justify release for
certain offences and broadening the scope of the secondary ground. See Explanatory Notes to Bill C-71,
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975, 1st Sess., 20th Parl., 1975, cls. 47-48; Bail Reform Act, S.C. 197071-72, c. 37, s. 5, at para. 457.2; Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 48;
Gary T. Trotter, The Law of Bail in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1999), at 2-13.
51
Friedland, Detention Before Trial: A Study of Criminal Cases Tried in the Toronto Magistrates’ Courts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) [hereinafter “Friedland”].
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hearings and preliminary inquiries were open to the public and to
publicity, other than reporting confessions or admissions.52
Interestingly, in 1987, the Law Reform Commission of Canada recommended that the provisions requiring mandatory bans be abolished,
but there was no response from Parliament.53
In the early days of the Charter, section 517 was the subject of a constitutional challenge in Global Communications Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney
General).54 In a decision rendered before the Oakes test was developed,
and long before the pre-Charter common law rule was reformulated in
Dagenais, the Ontario Court of Appeal had little difficulty in upholding
section 517 on the basis of protection of fair trial interests by preventing
supposed prejudice to potential jurors. Section 539, dealing with the ban
52
Hon. J.C. McRuer, Ontario Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report No. 1,
vol. 2 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1968), c. 49, “Publication of Proceedings Before Trial”, at 755-69,
especially 763 [hereinafter “McRuer Report”] (emphasis added). As the McRuer Report observed in
1968, in comments equally applicable to bail hearings:
The risk is that wide publication of the evidence given at a preliminary inquiry may so
influence the minds of prospective jurors that they will approach their duties with conscious or unconscious bias against the accused, or that the public mind in the community
will be so aroused that members of a trial jury will be intimidated by the force of public
opinion. We have grave doubts that this is a real risk. In the first place, at the time of a
preliminary inquiry no one, including the jurors, knows who the jurors at the trial will be.
In metropolitan areas the public memory is very short and individuals are largely anonymous. Few members of the public can remember what they have read or heard about a
particular case for many days, let alone months. In less populous areas gossip and rumour spread more easily, but gossip and rumour thrive on secrecy. It is much more likely
that vicious and inaccurate gossip will be spread throughout a community by individuals
who claim to have knowledge than by fair and accurate report by news media.
53
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 56: Public and Media Access to the
Criminal Process (Ottawa, 1987), at 76-77 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added):
These provisions, in our view, are overly restrictive of freedom of expression, notwithstanding that they have both been found to be constitutionally valid. The mandatory
nature of the prohibitions and their breadth constitute an unjustifiable intrusion on the
principle of maximum openness. Other similar mandatory orders have, in fact, been
found to offend the Charter. Our approach here is consistent with our earlier Recommendation 3 that no automatic bans should remain in the Criminal Code. ...
We would replace the present limitations with our Recommendation ... that an order
should only be made when necessary to satisfy a substantial competing interest. ... It
would require that a justice presiding at a bail hearing or preliminary inquiry consider
whether other means of guaranteeing a fair trial would be effective before deciding to
impose a publication ban. ...
... We would remove the accused’s entitlement to an automatic publication ban on all
evidence tendered at bail hearings and preliminary inquiries ... [I]f either the defence or
the prosecution seeks a limit on the presumption of openness, it must discharge the corresponding onus of proof.
54
[1984] O.J. No. 3066, 44 O.R. (2d) 609 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Global Communications”].
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on preliminary inquiries, was upheld on a similar basis in another early
Charter decision in New Brunswick.55
In light of the development of the Oakes test, the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sierra Club test, and the other decisions of the Supreme
Court favouring openness under the Charter, sections 517 and 539
became ripe for challenge.

VI. TORONTO STAR V. CANADA: THE ARRESTS OF
THE “TORONTO 18”
In 2006, 14 adults and four young persons were charged in Brampton, Ontario with various terrorism-related offences under the Criminal
Code. The arrests raised widespread concerns about national security and
the threat of terrorism, and were the subject of intense media scrutiny,
locally, nationally and internationally. The police held press conferences
announcing the arrests. Between June 3 and June 12, 2006, there were at
least 4,710 articles reporting on the arrests by news organizations around
the world, including virtually all local and national media as well as
international media, such as CNN, BBC News, The Los Angeles Times,
Al-Jazeera, The Bangkok Post, The Sydney Morning Herald, The New
York Times and The Wall Street Journal.56
Significant details about the alleged terrorist plots and the accused
were disclosed by the police and reported, including the following:
•

•
•

The accused plotted to bomb the Toronto Stock Exchange, the CSIS
Toronto Office, the CN Tower, the CBC, the Parliament buildings
and/or the Peace Tower, and to storm the Parliament buildings, take
political leaders hostage and behead the Prime Minister.
The accused were equipped with three tons of ammonium nitrate,
other bomb-making materials, handguns, a Rambo-style assault
knife, camouflage uniforms and walkie-talkies.
The accused set up and attended a terrorist training camp in
Washago, Ontario and tested explosives in Matheson, Ontario.
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R. v. Banville, [1983] N.B.J. No. 110, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 312 (N.B.Q.B.).
See Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v. Canada, [2009] O.J. No. 288, 2009 ONCA 59, at
para. 4 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Toronto Star v. Canada – CA”]. Additional facts may be found in
the court Record.
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The accused were motivated by ideology supportive of militant
Islamic causes, and were inspired by al-Qaeda. Some of the accused
had links with Islamic militants and suspected terrorists in the
United States and Europe. Certain of the accused allegedly had prior
convictions for weapons offences and theft.

Many of the allegations about the plans, preparations and motivations came from the police press conference following the arrests, at
which they displayed purported bomb-making materials including a red
cell phone wired to an explosive detonator. Statements from official
sources included the following:
This group posed a real and serious threat. It had the capacity and intent
to carry out these attacks ... our investigation and arrests prevented the
assembly of any bombs and the attacks from being carried out ... it was
at the point when we felt we could no longer let them continue in their
actions without a threat to the public. [Michael McDonell, Assistant
Commissioner, RCMP]
The suspects appeared to have become adherents of a violent ideology
inspired by al-Qaeda. [Luc Portelance, Assistant Director of Operations,
CSIS]57

At a court appearance a few days after this firestorm of publicity, a
justice of the peace imposed a publication ban under section 517 for the
show cause hearings of all the adult accused, even though some of the
accused had opposed the ban.58 A media coalition led by the New Yorkbased Associated Press moved to quash the publication ban on the basis
that it should not apply to all accused when not all had requested a ban.
Justice Durno of the Ontario Superior Court denied the media application, finding (among other things) that “when persons are charged in the
same information, and one seeks a mandatory order under s. 517, the
order applies to all accused. Any other interpretation makes no practical
57

See Jonathan Jenkins, “Cell Targeted CSIS and Police; ‘They Were Going After Institutional Targets’, Sources Says” The Toronto Sun (June 4, 2006), at 2; Michelle Shephard & Isabel
Teotonio, “Bomb-making material delivered in police sting” The Toronto Star (June 4, 2006), at A3;
Doug Struck, “Canada Holds 17 in Alleged Bomb Plot; Strikes on Ontario Sites Said Imminent” The
Washington Post (June 4, 2006), at A1; Beth Duff-Brown, “Canada foils terrorist attack with arrest
of 17 al-Qaida-inspired Suspects” The Associated Press (June 3, 2006); Beth Duff-Brown,
“Canadian Police Reportedly Moved in on Terrorist Suspects After Delivery of Bomb Materials”
The Associated Press (June 4, 2006).
58
Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 5.
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sense.”59 The appellants then challenged the constitutionality of section
517 of the Criminal Code, supported by two of the accused. Justice
Durno then held that he was bound by the 1984 decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Global Communications that upheld section 517.60
Despite the extraordinary allegations and sensational public nature of
the arrests, a number of the accused were released on bail — some even
on consent. And while the challenge to the ban continued, the Crown
stayed charges against at least three accused persons, while proceedings
continued against others. No explanation was, or could be, given for
these events due to the publication ban.
The media appealed Durno J.’s decisions to the Ontario Court of Appeal. A five-judge panel was unanimous that the decision in Global
Communications should be overruled. Justice Feldman, speaking for the
majority (Laskin and Simmons JJ.A. concurring), accepted the Crown’s
assertion that the purpose of the mandatory ban was to provide the
accused with an effective and expeditious means to prevent jurors from
being exposed to prejudicial information that might be disclosed at their
bail hearing.61 However, she found that section 517 was overbroad.
Specifically, it did not meet the rational connection and minimal impairment tests under R. v. Oakes62 to the extent that it imposed a mandatory
ban even when there was no prospect of a jury trial. As she put it, “[f]air
trial rights cannot be said to be at risk where a judge, sitting alone, is
exposed to prejudicial information which should not be admitted at
trial.”63 As a remedy, Feldman J.A. purported to cure the breach by
adding to section 517 the words “where and for so long as the charge(s)
may be tried by a jury” after “shall on application by the accused”.64
Justice Rosenberg (Juriansz J.A. concurring) dissented. He would
have struck down the section 517 ban entirely, on the basis that its
deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.65 Justice Rosenberg
described section 517 as a “dramatic curb on freedom of expression”,
59

Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2006] O.J. No. 5781, 211 C.C.C. (3d) 234, at
para. 101 (Ont. S.C.J.).
60
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2007] O.J. No. 5729, 84 O.R. (3d) 766, at
para. 48 (Ont. S.C.J.); Global Communications, supra, note 54.
61
Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 239.
62
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
63
Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 185.
64
Id., at paras. 185, 250, 255.
65
Id., at paras. 70-108.
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and observed that the mandatory ban is “all-embracing; it prohibits
publication of ‘the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the reasons, if any, given or to be given by the justice.’
Thus, even the reasons for releasing or detaining the accused, which may
be of considerable interest to the public, cannot be published at the time
the decision is made.”66 He also noted that although section 517 “does
not prevent anyone from attending court to witness the operation of the
bail system first hand, the section effectively prevents access to the
courts for most of the population”.67 He observed that in the overwhelming majority of cases in which a publication ban is imposed, the ban does
not serve the objective protecting the accused from a jury tainted by pretrial publicity since less than 2 per cent of all criminal cases are tried by a
jury.68 To remedy the unconstitutionality of section 517, Rosenberg J.A.
would have declared the words “and shall on application by the accused”
to be of no force and effect.69
The media appealed to the Supreme Court, asking that the dissenting
view of Rosenberg J.A. be adopted. Among other things, the media
appellants submitted that the majority’s remedy of “reading down” the
application of section 517 to situations where a jury trial was not, or was
no longer, possible, had little practical effect as most cases at least have
the possibility of going to a jury at the early stages, and that the Dagenais/Mentuck test, properly applied, could rarely justify bans on the
publication of bail hearings.

VII. THE ALBERTA CASE: R. V. WHITE70
A challenge to section 517 was also brought in Alberta, although in a
case raising quite different facts. It involved a high-profile murder, in
which the accused was charged with killing his wife. White was granted
bail, but his release was subsequently revoked by a decision of the Court
66

Id., at paras. 31-32.
Id., at para. 33.
68
Id., at para. 80. Statistics from the Attorney General of Ontario filed in the case suggest
that the number is much lower, perhaps 0.1 per cent — about 500 out of 500,000 charges in Ontario
per year.
69
Id., at para. 3. Justice Rosenberg would have also suspended the declaration of invalidity
for one year to allow Parliament to consider alternative legislation.
70
[2005] A.J. No. 1727, 2005 ABCA 435 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “White”]; [2007] A.J.
No. 608, 2007 ABQB 359 (Alta. Q.B.).
67
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of Appeal. As the ban under section 517 does not apply to appellate
proceedings, and as neither party sought to justify a common law
discretionary restriction on publication, there was no publication ban on
the bail proceedings before the Court of Appeal. However, the original
section 517 ban on the proceedings before the Judge who had granted
bail remained in place. The media moved, in these circumstances, to
have section 517 of the Criminal Code declared unconstitutional in order
to have the ban on the original bail hearing lifted. Justice Brooker, who
had originally granted bail, agreed with the media that section 517 was
aimed at preventing jury contamination and could not be justified. He
noted that the Crown had not presented any evidence to support a
rational connection between the restriction on publication and the
accused’s right to a fair trial by a jury, that the section does not minimally impair Charter rights as it applies even to non-jury trials, and that
the salutary effects of the legislation were not proportionate to its
deleterious effects.
The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned Brooker J.’s decision, concluding that a section 517 ban “merely defers publication and that the
values of protecting fair access to bail and the right to a fair trial were
benefits that outweighed the deleterious effects of the restrictions”.71

VIII. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION UPHOLDING SECTION 517
Justice Deschamps, writing for eight of the nine justices on the Supreme Court (Abella J. dissented), upheld the constitutionality of section
517 in its entirety, even overturning the relatively limited reading down
of the section by the majority in the Ontario Court of Appeal. In contrast
to Toronto Star v. Ontario, which focused on the infringement of section
2(b) (“the administration of justice thrives on exposure to light — and
withers under a cloud of secrecy”),72 the majority in Toronto Star v.
Canada focused on the rights of the accused, opening with the following
statement: “[U]pholding the rights of Canadian citizens by fostering trial
fairness and safeguarding liberty interests is central to the criminal

71
R. v. White, [2008] A.J. No. 956, 2008 ABCA 294 (Alta. C.A.), as summarized by
Deschamps J.A. in Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC, supra, note 11, at para. 5.
72
Toronto Star v. Ontario, supra, note 1, at para. 1.
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justice process.”73 This criminal context drove the Court’s analysis which
led to a favouring of fair trial interests over openness. And while the
Court said, again, that “the test developed in Dagenais/Mentuck incorporates the essence of the balancing exercise mandated by the Oakes
test”,74 it is difficult to rationalize the Court’s decision with its earlier
“unwavering decisions” favouring openness.
How did the Court reach this result? First, the majority concluded
that that there were two “pressing and substantial” objectives underlying
section 517: (i) to safeguard the right to a fair trial; and (ii) to ensure
expeditious bail hearings.75 This finding was broader than the finding of
both the majority and the dissent at the Ontario Court of Appeal, both of
which expressed the view that the primary objective of section 517 was
to foster trial fairness. In response to the argument that the second
objective was a new or impermissible “shifting purpose” not evident in
any of the legislative debates or raised by the Crown 25 years earlier in
Global Communications, Deschamps J. stated that the two objectives are
“inextricably linked, as the latter embraces the former”. The acceptance
of this new, second purpose, was derived from the “particular emphasis
placed in the Ouimet Report on ensuring expeditious bail hearings”.76
However, that objective is met through other provisions (such as section
503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which requires that an accused be
brought before a justice “without unreasonable delay”) and was never
linked to section 517. But by stating the objective this broadly, the majority
was able to find that the other elements of the Oakes test were met.
Second, Deschamps J. concluded that a “rational connection can
clearly be found” between the adopted means and Parliament’s objectives in enacting section 517. She noted that the bail hearing process is
informal, must be brought expeditiously and often includes evidence or
information that “would not necessarily be relevant or admissible at
trial”, such as confessions or bad character evidence.77 The ban, therefore, “prevents the dissemination of evidence which, for the sake of
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Supra, note 11, at para. 1.
Id., at para. 18.
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Id., at para. 19.
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Id., at para. 23; Roger Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections: Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969).
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ensuring an expeditious hearing, is untested”.78 But the link to an
expeditious hearing is not explained. Rather, as Deschamps J. notes, the
provision was proposed by the Ouimet Report “to prevent prejudicing the
accused at his trial by the dissemination of prejudicial matter which
would not be relevant or admissible at his trial”.79 Yet this concern for
fair trial interests, in light of Dagenais, makes the section difficult to
defend, as discussed below.
Turning to minimal impairment, Deschamps J. emphasized that the
initial stage of a criminal proceeding is “crucial” to the accused, and that
“if the justice were to hold a publication ban hearing, the accused would
have to prepare for that hearing in addition to preparing a rebuttal to the
grounds the prosecution might raise to justify detaining him or her”.80
After noting that “the hurdles the accused would face in such a hearing
are real”, she concluded that “[i]n light of the delay and the resources a
publication ban hearing would entail, and of the prejudice that could
result if untested evidence were made public, it would be difficult to
imagine a measure capable of achieving Parliament’s objectives that
would involve a more limited impairment of freedom of expression.”81
Justice Deschamps rejected various discretionary alternatives to complete mandatory bans that the media argued would trench less on freedom of expression.82 In view of the timing of any potential publication
ban hearing, and of how little the accused would know about the information the prosecutor would be conveying, she held that it would be
difficult for the accused to discharge the burden of showing that a ban
would be necessary under the Dagenais/Mentuck test.83
Surprisingly, especially in light of the “unwavering decisions” of the
previous decades, Deschamps J. seemed to find the ban was not particularly harsh because media are still permitted to publish “the identity of
78

Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 30.
Id., at para. 35.
81
Id., at para. 37.
82
These alternatives included: (i) procedures to address jury bias, such as challenge for
cause, change of venue and jury sequestration; (ii) time-limited publication bans ordered summarily,
subject to a follow-up hearing to determine if the ban should continue; (iii) “sunset clauses” that
would allow publication at the time of the bail hearing but ban publication closer to trial; (iv) limited
discretionary bans on specific prejudicial information and (v) a limited mandatory ban on specific
types of evidence, such as confessions.
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the accused, comment on the facts and the offence that the accused has
been charged with, and that an application for bail has been made, as
well as report on the outcome of the application”.84 She stated that “the
temporary nature of the ban is another important factor”, suggesting that
“the information it covers can eventually be made public once more
complete information produced in accordance with the standards applicable to criminal trials is available”.85 As Deschamps J. put it:
In summary, although information revealed at the bail hearing may no
longer be newsworthy by the time the media can release it, the ban
cannot be said to impair freedom of expression more than is necessary.
The ban is limited to a preliminary stage of the criminal justice process
and is not absolute, and the information the media are prevented from
publishing is untested, and is often one-sided and largely irrelevant to
the search for truth. The ban may make journalists’ work more difficult,
but it does not prevent them from conveying and commenting on basic,
relevant information.86

The Court at this stage also took issue with the majority decision in
the Ontario Court of Appeal that would have limited the ban to circumstances where a jury trial was and remained a possibility. Picking up on
Rosenberg J.A.’s comment that “the practical impact of the majority’s
conclusion is limited, since at the time of the bail hearing, the accused
has usually not yet made an election and not yet ruled out the possibility
of being tried by a jury”, Deschamps J. noted:
Because the bail hearing is held at the beginning of the process, even if
the provision is read down as the majority have done, the ban would
still apply in the vast majority of cases. Thus, this alternative cannot be
accepted. Not only does it fail to respond to the appellants’ concerns,
but it fails to settle the timing and resource issues that arise in respect
of the proposed publication ban hearing.87

Finally, Deschamps J. concluded that mandatory publication bans
had salutary benefits that outweighed their deleterious effects. Although
such bans were “not a perfect outcome”, she concluded that the mandatory ban “represents a reasonable compromise”, as the limits on the
84
85
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publication of information were “outweighed by the need to ensure
certainty and timeliness, to conserve resources, and to avert the disclosure of untested prejudicial information; in other words, to guarantee as
much as possible trial fairness and fair access to bail”.88
Justice Abella, in dissent, agreed with Rosenberg J.A. that the mandatory ban in section 517 should be struck down. Unlike Deschamps J.,
Abella J. emphasized the importance of openness:
This Court has a long pedigree in protecting the public’s right to be
aware of what takes place in the country’s courtrooms. It is based on
the premise that to maintain public trust in the justice system, the public
must be able to see the judicial process at work. The public’s ability to
engage in meaningful discussion about what a judge decides, depends
primarily on knowing why the particular decision is made. The
jurisprudence has, as a result, consistently attempted to enhance both
the visibility of the system and the confidence of the public.89

She characterized the effect of section 517 as “a profound interference” with the open courts principle because it had the effect, “for all but
the handful of people who are present in the courtroom, of denying
access to information surrounding a key aspect of the criminal justice
system — the decision whether or not to release an accused back in to
the community pending his or her trial”.90

IX. THE SUPREME COURT’S RETREAT FROM DAGENAIS
Toronto Star v. Canada represents a retreat by the Supreme Court
from its long history of upholding the open courts principle and freedom
of the press, and its skepticism that pre-trial publicity impairs fair trial
rights. The effect of Deschamps J.’s judgment, as Abella J. noted, is that
bail hearings can continue to operate — to paraphrase Bentham — in the
darkness of secrecy. This harms public confidence in the bail process, the
public’s right to scrutinize judicial processes, and fair trial interests, as
Berger J.A. of the Alberta Court of Appeal pointed out in the first White
decision.91
88
89
90
91

Id., at para. 60.
Id., at para. 65 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 67.
White, supra, note 70, at para. 16, per Berger J.A. in chambers:
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As noted above, Deschamps J. grounded her analysis of section 517
on the dual premises that mandatory publication bans requested by the
accused at bail hearings (i) safeguard fair trial rights; and (ii) ensure
expeditious bail hearings. Each of these rationales may be criticized.
1. Safeguarding Fair Trial Rights Does Not Require Mandatory
Publication Bans
Section 517 bluntly creates a sweeping ban on all information at bail
hearings, regardless of the evidence or information presented, and
regardless of how unlikely it may be — if it is even possible — that the
case will result in a jury trial. This is because section 517 applies to all
criminal cases, many of which, such as summary conviction offences,
cannot possibly be tried by a jury. As Rosenberg J.A. pointed out, “in the
overwhelming majority of cases in which a publication ban is imposed
and freedom of expression infringed, the ban does not serve the objective
of protecting the accused from a jury tainted by pre-trial publicity”.92
Although Rosenberg J.A. observed that “less than 2 percent of all
criminal cases are tried by jury”,93 in fact the statistics presented suggested that the number may be as low as 0.1 per cent. This point was also
made in the McRuer Report in recommending against publication bans.94
More significantly, however, there is no basis to conclude that publicity at a bail hearing will jeopardize the fairness of a jury trial. There
has never been a case in Canada in which an impartial jury has not been
found, regardless of the level of pre-trial publicity, including publicity
from prior trials where re-trials have been necessary,95 and where trials

I ask rhetorically: ‘How is public confidence enhanced by a “cone of silence” descending
over the careful and considered analysis of the adjudicator?’ Keeping the public in the
dark, in my opinion, can be a recipe for uninformed speculation fuelling widely publicized concern in the community — a far greater risk to the fair trial rights of the accused
and the Crown.
92
Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 80.
93
Id.
94
McRuer Report, supra, note 52, at 755-69, especially at 763.
95
As Rosenberg J.A. noted, “commentary from judges in Canada and other common-law
jurisdictions is virtually uniform that the impact of pre-trial publicity is speculative and that other
measures short of a contemporaneous ban on publication of the entire proceeding will protect the
accused’s fair trial rights”. See Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 93 (emphasis
added).
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have followed highly publicized public inquiries, such as Mount Cashel96
and Westray.97 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has addressed this issue
in several cases. Echoing the McRuer Report, Cory J. stated in Phillips:
In my view, the Westray Inquiry hearings would not present an
unacceptable risk to the s. 11(d) fair trial rights of the respondent
managers. Often the publicity pertaining to the evidence given at the
Inquiry will have little effect on potential jurors. The impact may be
fleeting and quickly fade away. How very quickly the details of a news
story can be forgotten. The passage of a very few days may suffice to
dim if not obliterate the memory of the reporting of Inquiry evidence.
The likelihood of a prejudicial effect upon fair trial rights may be small
indeed, a minor item washed away in the flood of information
generated daily by the media.98

The Supreme Court has also repeatedly emphasized its confidence in
the ability of jurors to disabuse themselves of information that it is not
entitled to consider.99 Addressing the jury’s ability to ignore prejudicial
pre-trial publicity, Lamer C.J.C., in Dagenais, expressed “doubt that
jurors are always adversely influenced by publications” and his belief
“that jurors are capable of following instructions from trial judges and

96

Kenny, supra, note 31.
Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [1995]
S.C.J. No. 36, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Phillips”].
98
Id., at para. 161 (emphasis added). To similar effect, five judges of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, in R. v. Hubbert, quoted the following with approval (emphasis added):
This does, in my judgment, lead to a prima facie presumption that anybody who may
have read that kind of information might find it difficult to reach a verdict in a fairminded way. It is, however, a matter of human experience, and certainly a matter of the
experience of those who practice in the criminal courts, first, that the public’s recollection is short, and, secondly, that the drama, if I may use that term, of a trial almost always has the effect of excluding from recollection that which went before.
See R. v. Hubbert, [1975] O.J. No. 2595, 29 C.C.C. (2d) 279, at para. 30 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter
“Hubbert”], quoting Lawton J. in R. v. Kray (1969), 53 Cr. App. R. 412, at 415. See also R. v.
Murrin, [1997] B.C.J. No. 3182 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Murrin”], where Oppal J. remarked at para.
20 that “[c]ommon sense tells us that public knowledge is at times fleeting in matters of this nature”;
White, supra, note 70, at para. 17, where Berger J.A. stated, “I very much doubt that prospective
jurors would retain and recall the details of a 30 second news clip or a seven inch column summarizing submissions made by counsel, or reasons for decision pronounced by a bail judge”; R. v. Steele,
2007 CarswellOnt 3045 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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See, e.g., R. v. Vermette, [1988] S.C.J. No. 47, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 985, at 992-94 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Sherratt, [1991] S.C.J. No. 21, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 509, at 525 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sherratt”].
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ignoring information not presented to them in the course of criminal
proceedings”.100
The Supreme Court accepts that jurors are capable of ignoring highly
prejudicial information (such as prior convictions) when so directed, and
can consider prejudicial information for certain purposes (such as
credibility) and not for others (guilt or innocence). This reflects a high
degree of confidence in the ability of jurors to do their job. This faith in
juries is central to the criminal justice system. As Dickson C.J.C. stated:
… the Court should not be heard to call into question the capacity of
jurors to do the job assigned to them. The ramifications of any such
statement could be enormous. Moreover, the fundamental right to a
jury trial has recently been underscored by s. 11(f) of the Charter. If
that right is important, it is logically incoherent to hold that juries are
incapable of following the explicit instructions of the judge.101

In Phillips v. Nova Scotia, in refusing an application to stay a public
inquiry on the basis that pre-trial publicity would prejudice the right to a
fair trial, Cory J. stated:
I am of the view that this objective [a fair trial] is readily attainable in
the vast majority of criminal trials even in the face of a great deal of
publicity. The jury system is a cornerstone of our democratic society.
The presence of a jury has for centuries been the hallmark of a fair trial.
I cannot accept the contention that increasing mass media attention to a
particular case has made this vital institution either obsolete or
unworkable. There is no doubt that extensive publicity can prompt
discussion, speculation, and the formation of preliminary opinions in
the minds of potential jurors. However, the strength of the jury has
always been the faith accorded to the good will and good sense of the
individual jurors in any given case.102

Many lower court judgments make similar statements, some in the
face of very prejudicial and “sustained” pre-trial information.103 In
Kenny, for example, a stay of proceeding was denied where the accused
100
Dagenais, supra, note 7, at para. 87. In Dagenais, Lamer C.J.C. allowed that there could
be a possible exception in a case of sustained pre-trial publicity, but that is not what would result
from the publication of show cause hearings.
101
R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at 691-94, especially 693
(S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
102
Phillips, supra, note 97, at para. 133.
103
Sherratt, supra, note 99, at 525.
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was charged after the “Mount Cashel” Inquiry, at which there had been
intense media coverage, including testimony (provided under relaxed
rules of evidence) from seven of the 10 sexual assault complainants.104
In White, Berger J.A. commented:
The Applicant has been charged with second-degree murder. His
preliminary hearing will not take place until the new year. If committed
to stand trial, jury selection would begin months later. I very much doubt
that prospective jurors would retain and recall the details of a 30 second
news clip or a seven inch column summarizing submissions made by
counsel, or reasons for decision pronounced by a bail judge. Even if
some did, the usual admonitions to the array, challenges for cause, and
jury instructions themselves, are, in my opinion, sufficient safeguards to
ensure that an impartial jury, true to their oaths, will be empanelled.
While the underlying fear is that issues will be pre-judged or that there
will be “trial by media” without the benefit of safeguards inherent in
legal proceedings, I am convinced that the average citizen understands
full well what Voltaire meant when he said in 1760: “When we hear news
we should always wait for the sacrament of confirmation.” 105

Justice Berger’s opinion is consistent with Lamer C.J.C.’s comments
in Dagenais about the availability of alternative measures:
Possibilities that readily come to mind, however, include adjourning
trials, changing venues, sequestering jurors, allowing challenges for
cause and voir dires during jury selection, and providing strong judicial
direction to the jury. Sequestration and judicial direction were available

104

Kenny, supra, note 31, at 14-15:
I accept that people are biased by pre-trial publicity in the sense that they develop preconceived ideas. However, I accept that they are capable of responding to the instructions
of the Trial Judge and of obeying their oath, notwithstanding any previously formed
opinions. See Hubbert and Keegstra. The notion that people are unable to assess how
much they have been biased by publicity is one which attacks the very heart of the jury
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for the Dagenais jury. Apart from sequestration, all of the other effective
alternatives to bans were available for the other three accused.106

In Hubbert, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that “[p]rior information about a case, and even the holding of a tentative opinion about it,
does not make partial a juror sworn to render a true verdict according to
the evidence.”107 Put another way, an accused is entitled to an impartial
jury, not an ignorant one.
Similar faith in the ability of jurors to do their job impartially is
found in other common law jurisdictions. In England, in Montgomery v.
HM Advocate and another,108 the accused were brought to trial after a
firestorm of adverse publicity, including comments from a judge about
the culpability of the accused that were widely reported. The defendants’
motion for a stay on the basis that they could not have a fair trial in light
of the adverse pre-trial publicity was dismissed. In the House of Lords,
Lord Hope of Craighead noted that “the entire system of trial by jury is
based upon the assumption that the jury will follow the instructions
which they receive from the trial judge and that they will return a true
verdict in accordance with the evidence.”109
In R. v. B., the English Court of Appeal recently addressed the ability
of jurors to follow instructions despite pre-trial publicity in a case
involving charges of terrorist activity that had attracted much interest,
noting that “[j]uries follow the directions which the judge will give them

106
Dagenais, supra, note 7, at para. 79. For examples of courts employing the alternative
measure of sunset clauses, see R. v. Brown, [1998] O.J. No. 482, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 187, at 15-18 (Ont.
Gen. Div.) [hereinafter “Brown”]; R. v. Lake, [1997] O.J. No. 5446, at paras. 24-27 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
[hereinafter “Lake”]; Murrin, supra, note 98, at paras. 16-21.
107
Hubbert, supra, note 98, at para. 29. See also Brown, id., at para. 13: “Under our law the
courts have consistently expressed confidence in the dynamics of the jury system as a means of
ensuring juries render fair and impartial verdicts. Prior information about an accused or the trial does
not in itself disqualify a potential juror — nor does the holding of a tentative opinion about the
case.”; R. v. Bryant, [1980] O.J. No. 3914, 54 C.C.C. (2d) 54, at para. 23 (Ont. H.C.J.) (quoting the
McRuer Report: “[t]he requirement that the verdict of a jury must be unanimous constitutes a real
safeguard against bias or prejudice. There may be some risk that one or two jurors may allow their
preconceived notions to deflect them from the requirements of their oaths as jurymen, but that
twelve jurors will all be derelict to the sanctity of their oaths is very remote”); R. v. Keegstra, [1991]
A.J. No. 232, [1991] 63 C.C.C. (3d) 110 at para. 10 (Alta. C.A.); Lake, id.; Edmonton (City) v. Kara,
[1995] A.J. No. 5, [1995] 4 W.W.R. 99, at para. 10 (Alta. Q.B.); Murrin, id., at paras. 17-21; Kenny,
supra, note 31, at 8-18.
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to focus exclusively on the evidence and to ignore anything they may
have heard or read out of court.”110
Similar positions have, not surprisingly, been stated by the highest
courts in Australia,111 Ireland112 and the United States.113
Nor does the social science evidence support the concern that jurors
will be prejudiced. In the Ontario Court of Appeal, Feldman J.A. noted
that there is “no definitive evidence of the extent to which juries’ verdicts
may be affected by … information they glean outside the trial”.114 Justice
Rosenberg’s review of the social science literature concluded that “it is
difficult to draw firm conclusions from this material”.115
It is striking, therefore, that Deschamps J. grounded her judgment in
Toronto Star v. Canada to such an extent on the possibility of jury
tainting in light of this long line of jurisprudence that addresses this
concern. Indeed, it might be said that here too there have been “unwavering decisions” of the Court that pre-trial publicity will not prejudice fair
trial rights, and that ample safeguards exist to address the issue when the
concern may exist — as in Dagenais. Yet none of this jurisprudence was
referred to by the majority. As Abella J., dissenting, stated:
Concerns over pre-trial publicity were addressed by this Court when
it considered the question of discretionary bans in Dagenais and
Mentuck. The new threshold articulated in those cases was a high one,
and bans were only to be imposed where they are “necessary” to
protect against “real and substantial” risks to an accused’s fair trial
rights (Dagenais, at p. 878), or “serious” risks to the administration of
justice (Mentuck, at para. 32). Section 517, in granting an automatic
ban at the request of an accused regardless of whether he or she can
demonstrate such a degree of risk, completely collapses the
constitutional framework in Dagenais/Mentuck, leaving out of the
110

R. v. B., [2006] EWCA Crim 2692, at para. 31 (C.A.) [hereinafter “R. v. B.”]. See also
Montgomery, supra, note 108, at 673-74; Ex parte Telegraph Plc., [1993] 2 All E.R. 971, at 978
(C.A.); R. v. Abu Hamza, [2006] EWCA Crim 2918, [2007] QB 659 (C.A.). More recently, in
Sinclair v. HM Advocate, the English Court of Appeal noted that “the whole jury system depends on
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disobey the instructions on law or procedure which they are given by the trial judge”. See Sinclair v.
HM Advocate, [2007] HCJAC 27, at para. 16 (C.A.).
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balance entirely the public’s presumptive right to know what goes on in
a courtroom.
Even if one is disinclined to accept what is to me the cogent
evidence in the reasons of Rosenberg J.A. demonstrating how
speculative the concerns over pre-trial publicity are, there remains the
possibility of remedies such as a partial ban, challenges for cause, or a
change of venue if there is a sufficient risk of prejudice. We should also
be able to rely on the ability of a properly instructed jury to disregard
irrelevant evidence, a reliance that is at the foundation of our belief in
juries in criminal trials (Dagenais, at pp. 884-85; see also R. v. Corbett,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at pp. 692-93; R. v. Vermette, [1988] 1 S.C.R.
985, at pp. 992-93).
.....
In any event, s. 517 only protects an accused from disclosure of pretrial information from a bail hearing. There is no legislative protection
from potentially prejudicial pre-trial information that emanates from
sources other than the bail hearing. In the absence of such a generalized
ban, the benefit of a ban only on bail hearing information seems to me
to be too porous to justify the seriousness of the infringement.116

2. Section 517 Is Not Necessary to Ensure Expeditious Bail
Hearings
Justice Deschamps’s decision largely focused on what she had found
was the other purpose of the legislation — to ensure expeditious bail
hearings. Without the mandatory ban, she said, “an additional burden
would be placed on the accused at a time when he or she is extremely
vulnerable”, perhaps “overwhelmed by the criminal process”, without
counsel or the “opportunity to learn what evidence the prosecution
intends to adduce”.117 As Deschamps J. put it: “They should be devoting
their resources and energy to obtaining their release, not to deciding
whether to compromise on liberty in order to avoid having evidence
aired outside the courtroom.”118 She continued:

116
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Toronto Star v. Canada – SCC, supra, note 11, at paras. 71-73.
Id., at para. 36.
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In light of the delay and the resources a publication ban hearing would
entail, and of the prejudice that could result if untested evidence were
made public, it would be difficult to imagine a measure capable of
achieving Parliament’s objectives that would involve a more limited
impairment of freedom of expression. If issues unrelated to the release
of the accused were added to the bail hearing, this would require the
consideration of matters extraneous to the bail process and could have a
domino effect on other bail hearings in the same forum, thereby
delaying the administration of justice.119

Justice Deschamps referred repeatedly to the burden on the accused
and the delay that would be caused if publication bans had to be justified
at bail hearings. While she recognized that bans are discretionary when
sought by the prosecutor, “[u]nlike the accused, the prosecutor knows
exactly what allegations are to be made against the accused and also
knows what evidence will likely be introduced at trial.”120 While one
might have thought that this knowledge could — and should — be used
by the Crown to also protect fair trial interests in appropriate cases, such
as, for example, where evidence of a confession will be presented at a
bail hearing and so that fact might be the subject of a ban, this was not
considered by the court.
The appellant’s argument, based on the Dagenais test, was dismissed
in the following statement:
The appellants argue that bail hearings would almost never be delayed
if the ban were discretionary because the Dagenais test would rarely be
met, since jury bias is purely speculative. As a result, counsel would
seldom bring motions for bans. This proposition is based on the
assumption that accused would renounce their interest in trial fairness
to ensure an expeditious hearing. This is exactly the kind of
compromise the mandatory ban is intended to avoid. The appellants’
argument is in fact based on the incorrect view that the ban has nothing
to do with the rights of the accused to a fair trial and to fair access to
bail. It is simply wrong to assume that neither the bail hearing itself nor
the disclosure of information, evidence or the reasons for the justice’s
order would have any effect on the accused’s interests.121

119
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Id., at para. 37.
Id., at para. 46.
Id., at para. 57.
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This reasoning, however, is based on the presumption that “trial fairness” will be compromised by a ban. It fails to consider that in the very
small number of appropriate cases where a limited ban might be justified
(such as where a confession is adduced) the issuance and tailoring of a
ban can be effected promptly and without delay. As Rosenberg J.A.
observed in the Ontario Court of Appeal:
Even granting the possibility that pre-trial publicity can influence jury
behaviour, this would only be the case in the most unusual instances,
being cases where a single powerful piece of inadmissible evidence
comes to the attention of the jury pool at a time proximate enough to
the trial to have an impact.122

Notice to the media is not required, and should not result in adjournments, as Abella J. pointed out in dissent.123
The Dagenais test, properly applied, would rarely, if ever, justify
bans on publication of bail hearings, and may only, in very limited
circumstances, justify even a partial ban. In those limited circumstances,
which may be identified by the Crown or the defence (e.g., evidence of a
confession, or inculpatory wiretap evidence, perhaps), a ban may be
sought and justified under the flexible Dagenais test. In other circumstances — the vast majority of cases — it would be irrational for accused
persons to bring futile motions that might delay their own release.
In any event, publication bans, if sought, can and should usually be
decided summarily, just as bail hearings proceed in an expeditious
122

Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 90.
Id., at para. 74. The Supreme Court has never said that notice — while desirable — is
mandatory. As Fish J. stated in Toronto Star v. Ontario, supra, note 1, at para. 31:
It hardly follows, however, that the Dagenais/Mentuck test should be applied mechanistically. Regard must always be had to the circumstances in which a sealing order is sought
by the Crown, or by others with a real and demonstrated interest in delaying public disclosure. The test, though applicable at all stages, is a flexible and contextual one. Courts
have thus tailored it to fit a variety of discretionary actions, such as confidentiality orders,
judicial investigative hearings, and Crown-initiated applications for publication bans.
And as Rosenberg J.A. noted in Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 97:
… as to notice, the justice has a discretion whether to give notice and the form of notice:
Dagenais, at 869. Given the need for an expedited bail hearing to avoid the unwarranted
detention of the accused, it would seem to me that in most cases the justice need not give
notice to the media. Such an approach appears to be authorized by Named Person v.
Vancouver Sun, [2007] S.C.J. No. 43, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253 (S.C.C.), where the Court
held, at paras. 53-54, that notice need not be given every time an in camera proceeding is
to take place …
123
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manner, with judges receiving all evidence that is “credible or trustworthy”, often simply allegations from the police or Crown counsel.124 As
Rosenberg J.A. stated:
As to the issue of the accused needing time to gather “evidence” of the
risk to trial fairness or the administration of justice, this issue must be
put in context. As already noted, the strict rules of evidence do not
apply at bail hearings. In my view, in considering whether to impose a
publication ban, the justice of the peace is entitled to act upon the kind
of information that can be received on a bail hearing, being evidence
that is considered credible and trustworthy. It is not unusual for
evidence to be presented through statements of facts read out by Crown
counsel. It would seem to me that the justice of the peace would be
entitled to act upon submissions of counsel in deciding whether or not
to impose a publication ban. It is not practicable to expect the party
seeking the order to adduce the kind of evidence that might be
admissible at a trial, in accordance with the normal rules of evidence.125

X. WHAT OF OPENNESS? SALUTARY AND DELETERIOUS EFFECTS
Justice Deschamps did note that section 517 has the deleterious effect of banning the media “from informing the population on matters of
interest which could otherwise be subject more widely to public debate”.126 However, she concluded that “on balance ... the deleterious
effects of the limits on the publication of information are outweighed by
the need to ensure certainty and timeliness, to conserve resources, and to
avert the disclosure of untested prejudicial information”.127 As noted
earlier, Deschamps J. minimized some of the effects of the ban, noting
that it “is not an absolute ban on access to the courts or on publication”
and that it is “temporary”, that it “applies only with respect to the bail
process, and the information it covers can eventually be made public

124
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 518(1)(e). See also R. v. John, [2001] O.J. No.
3396, at para. 56 (Ont. S.C.J.), per Hill J.: “A bail hearing is not a trial. Nor should this summary
proceeding assume the complications of a trial.”
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Toronto Star v. Canada – CA, supra, note 56, at para. 99.
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once more complete information produced in accordance with the
standards applicable to criminal trials is available”.128
These rationales for overriding section 2(b) are troubling, and inconsistent with prior decisions of the Court. While Deschamps J. may be
correct that section 517 does not create an “absolute ban”, it prevents
reporting of any meaningful information that would allow the public to
know why an accused is detained or released. This “cone of silence”129
prevents an understanding by the public of the bail process generally — a
critical aspect of criminal justice. The decision whether to grant bail can
have a more significant impact on the accused than any other decision in
a criminal case, and may lead to the only term in custody he or she will
serve. Professor Friedland noted many years ago that
[t]he period before trial is too important to be left to guess-work and
caprice. ... but also may have a substantial impact on the result of the
trial itself. The law should abhor any unnecessary deprivation of liberty
and positive steps should be taken to ensure that detention before trial
is kept to a minimum.130

Imprisonment prior to conviction, no matter how brief, is an exercise
of the utmost power of the state to limit an individual’s freedom, at a
time when the individual is presumed to be innocent.
There is a very significant public interest in judicial decisions about
bail. In R. v. Hall, the Supreme Court upheld the provision that allows a
judge to deny bail when necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. The existence of this section, and this Court’s decision
that it is a valid ground on which to deny bail, underlines the importance
of judicial interim release decisions. As McLachlin C.J.C. stated:
“Without public confidence, the bail system and the justice system
generally stand compromised.”131
Yet, as Rosenberg J.A. noted in the Ontario Court of Appeal, section
517 “stifles informed public participation in one of the crucial aspects of
the criminal justice system”.132 He continued:
128
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Section 517, however, prevents the dissemination of information
necessary to promote public confidence in the bail system. This is the
case both at the time the initial decision is made, and later where
subsequent events may raise questions as to the wisdom of that
decision, as when the accused who is on bail commits further offences.
The fact that an accused was on bail when he or she committed a
further serious offence often receives wide coverage in the media.
However, the public is left to speculate as to why the accused was
initially released, because of the s. 517 order.133

Such concerns — deleterious effects — are given short shift by the
majority in the Supreme Court — mentioned only briefly and dismissed
with the paternalistic suggestion that a bail hearing “may not be fully
understood by the public” and that “the media would be better equipped
to explain the judicial process to the public if the information they could
convey were not restricted”.134 One might have thought these concerns
favoured openness! Indeed, as the cloak of secrecy applies to bail
decisions as well as the hearings themselves, section 517 likely inhibits
academic scrutiny of the process.
Nor does the majority ever contend with its “unwavering” line of
cases that the openness principle applies at every stage of the criminal
process. While the Court refers, for example, to Re Vancouver Sun,135 for
the proposition that all discretionary bans are subject to the Dagenais/Mentuck test, it makes no attempt to reconcile that decision which
effectively turned ex parte — and necessarily in camera — investigative
hearings into hearings in which Dagenais/Mentuck applies.
The fact that a ban is “temporary” is not a justification, but should
only be considered once it is determined that a ban is necessary at all.
This was the approach of the Court in Toronto Star v. Ontario where a
delay of 90 days in access to search warrant materials was not a justification for the ban. In any event, these bans may be long-lasting and are
often in place for years. Yet, as Rosenberg J.A. stated in the Court of
Appeal, “the public is most interested in the information disclosed at the
bail hearing … when the bail decision is made. That is the point in the

133
Id., at para. 78 (emphasis added). Similar points were made by Abella J., dissenting in the
Supreme Court, supra, note 11, at para. 68.
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proceedings when the public is entitled to scrutinize and hold the
criminal justice system to account.” 136
Courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of timeliness in
news reporting.137 As Doherty J.A. put it: “The values promoted by
s. 2(b) are not served by publication when the speaker has lost his
audience and the message to be conveyed has lost its purpose.”138 Justice
Nordheimer recently commented that “... transgression of fundamental
freedoms ought not to be readily justified on the basis that any such
infringements will be transient or short-lived”.139 Delayed scrutiny may,
in fact, cause harm, as Berger J.A. noted in White:
News is a perishable commodity ... [and] unjustified delay in permitting
full public access will have a deleterious effect on the ability of the
media to report, and, in the result, for the public to be informed.
Contemporaneous access to court documents and processes allows the
media to fulfill their legitimate role as the eyes and ears of the public.140

A further concern expressed by Deschamps J. also merits comment
— her reference to delaying publication until “more complete information produced in accordance with the standards applicable to criminal
trials is available”.141 This too seems inconsistent with Toronto Star v.
Ontario, where Fish J. confirmed the long line of jurisprudence that the
openness principle applies to all stages of the criminal process.142 An
Information to obtain a search warrant may be very one-sided, and will
be reported and regarded that way. So too an investigative hearing. If all
that occurs at a bail hearing is the reading of allegations by the Crown, or
the presentation of untested hearsay, then at least the public will learn of
136
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— and perhaps criticize — the process. But to suggest that reporting of
judicial acts must be dependent on evidence admissible at trials, when
those judicial acts are not so dependent, is inconsistent with MacIntyre
and Toronto Star v. Ontario, and is troubling indeed.
It should also be borne in mind that it is now simply not possible for
courts to control the spread of information — prejudicial or not, true or
false — over the Internet.143 Rumour and speculation can emanate from
— or be fuelled by — official sources. Law enforcement officials often
make public statements about accused persons and the allegations against
them at the time of arrest. It is irrational that police sources should be
able to make public statements — as occurred in Toronto Star v. Canada,
namely, that the accused were “adherents of a violent ideology inspired
by al-Qaeda” and that the arrests “prevented the assembly of any bombs
and the attacks from being carried out” — yet the public is then prevented from hearing these same allegations when they are raised (or not),
and potentially tested (or not), in a court of law. As Rosenberg J.A.
noted, the ban imposed by section 517 “has no effect on other pre-trial
publicity, some of which may be more inflammatory than the general
factual information presented at the bail hearing”.144
Unlike police sources and individuals posting information on the
Internet, news organizations have a duty to report fairly and accurately
on court proceedings.145 They are also subject to contempt charges if they
endanger fair trial interests. Newspapers and broadcasters act responsibly. There are no instances in Canada in which pre-trial publicity has
been found to have prejudiced a fair trial, or prevented the selection of an
impartial jury. As the English Court of Appeal recently pointed out,
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the responsibility for avoiding the publication of material which may
prejudice the outcome of a trial rests fairly and squarely on those
responsible for the publication. In our view, broadcasting authorities
and newspaper editors should be trusted to fulfil their responsibilities
accurately to inform the public of court proceedings, and to exercise
sensible judgment about the publication of comment which may
interfere with the administration of justice.146

Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the public will form a fixed
view of a matter as a result of a fair and accurate report on a bail hearing,
any more so than it does from hearing the police assert at press conferences that accused were planning a “terrorist attack”. Fair and accurate
reports on court proceedings are an antidote to rumour and innuendo.
They provide the public with legitimate information about judicial
proceedings.

XI. CONCLUSION
Public confidence and public scrutiny go hand in hand. As McLachlin C.J.C. wrote in Hall, “[w]ithout public confidence, the bail system
and the justice system generally stand compromised.”147 Yet, in light of
Toronto Star v. Canada, section 517 prevents public understanding and
scrutiny of what happens at bail hearings and how the grounds on which
people are detained or released are applied by judges. It is difficult to
have confidence in a process that is subject to such limited scrutiny.
Whether the Supreme Court’s departure from its “unwavering decisions”
on openness is an anomaly driven by concerns over fairness to an
accused, or a harbinger of the things to come remains to be seen.
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